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I.  INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM OUTLINE 
 
“I love fools’ experiments.  I am always making them.”1 
A.  The Benefit of Comparisons 
Stating that an apple is a green or red fruit and a wristwatch is not a 
fruit does not convey anything about either object.  As such 
comparisons are neither inherently useful nor per se justified as a 
scholarly or practical endeavor.  A comparative approach to U.S. patent 
law has to be conducted with a suitable counterpart.  “There are no less 
than 42 legal systems in the world, and comparison has traditionally 
focused on three major legal families . . . namely the civil law system, 
common law system and socialist system.”2  Instead of comparing the 
United States, a common law country, with socialist countries that are 
heavily decreasing in numbers and do not provide for patent systems 
that acknowledge substantial private property rights, the United States 
should be compared with either European Union law in general or with 
a civil law country. 
Because this Article deals with an infringement issue, it should be 
noted that pursuant to Article 64(3) of the European Patent Convention 
even infringement of a European patent (save infringement of national 
patents) is to be dealt with by national law.3  Thus, only the Member 
States of the European Union are left as suitable objects for a 
comparison. 
From the academic point of view, the United States could be 
compared to Portugal, Iceland, or Germany.  Although one has to agree 
with the proposition that the “[d]iscussion[] of the goals of comparative 
law often draw[s] an overly sharp distinction between its practical and 
its scientific aims,”4 and that the scientific benefit of each of the 
comparisons above would be of equal value, a comparison with one of 
the major European trade partners has to be considered the more 
 
1. LIFE AND LETTERS OF CHARLES DARWIN:  INCLUDING AN  
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL CHAPTER (Francis Darwin ed., 1897), reprinted in JOHN BARTLETT, 
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS:  A COLLECTION OF PASSAGES, PHRASES, AND PROVERBS 
TRACED TO THEIR SOURCES IN ANCIENT AND MODERN LITERATURE 445 (Justin Kaplan 
ed., 18th ed. 1992) (1855). 
2. PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 3 (1995). 
3. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 64(3), 1065 
U.N.T.S. 199, 274, available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/. 
4. MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A  
NUTSHELL 5 (2d ed. 1999). 
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practical, and thus, more useful approach.  Transatlantic patent 
disputes, namely infringement suits, arise more frequently with one of 
the European trading partners. 
B.  U.S. and German Patent Law 
Although it would go well beyond the scope of this Article and may 
be worthy of treatment in a thesis discussing and comparing the history 
of both legal systems, a brief introductory remark on the genesis of both 
patent law systems seems appropriate.  Contrary to usual common law 
thinking that legal principles were developed in Great Britain and later 
adopted and modified by the United States, the United States conceived 
of the need for patent protection sooner than Germany. 
President George Washington signed the Patent Act into law as 
early as 1790;5 whereas in eighteenth century Germany, a patent system 
was not felt to be a pressing need, at least not by the administration of 
the economically and politically most important state of Prussia.6  
According to an 1853 survey conducted by the Royal Prussian Ministry 
of Trade and Commerce that was administered to the Prussian District 
Governments (Bezirksregierungen) and Chambers of Trade, thirty-one 
out of forty-seven of these participants voted against the 
implementation of a patent protection scheme.7  Consequently, a 
uniform German patent act did not exist until 18778 and it was not until 
19369 that the statute acknowledged the inventor, and not the patent 
applicant, as the sole legitimate proprietor.10 
C.  The Problem 
With the parties to the comparison being established, the discussion 
will now turn to the specific problem at issue. 
It is the very dilemma of patent law, or as Professor Cornish put it, 
the “innate conflict in the objects for which patent systems exist,”11 that 
 
5. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790). 
6. At the respective time, before the foundation of the Deutsche Reich in 1871, 
Germany did not even exist as a nation, but consisted of a loose collection of small states. 
7. See Wolfgang Pfaller, Das Patentgesetz von 1877,  
http://www.people.freenet.de/patentgeschichte/1877.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2005). 
8. Patentgesetz [Patent Act], May 25, 1877 RGBl. I at 501 (F.R.G.). 
9. Patentgesetz [Patent Act], May 5, 1936 RGBl. II at 117 (F.R.G.). 
10. See Paul Bluhm, Die Entstehung des ersten gesamtdeutschen Patentgesetzes [Genesis 
of the First Uniform German Patent Act], 1952 GRUR 341, 341–46. 
11. William R. Cornish, Experimental Use of Patented Inventions in European 
Community States, 29 IIC 735, 735 (1998). 
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lays out the background for the specific issue:  striking a balance 
between the “attempt to promote interest in research while at the same 
time conferring the exclusivity incentive that a patent grants to the 
inventor.”12 
Abstractly speaking, he who seeks to invent something new will 
always build upon what his predecessors have invented.  One could thus 
argue that it is both logical and in the public interest to allow 
experiments with a patented invention.  This very abstract statement, 
however, oversimplifies the problem.  It does not address whether 
inventors may feel discouraged from refining and elaborating on an 
invention.  For example, in the pharmaceutical industry, mandatory 
prerequisites for marketing a new product may chill invention.  In the 
case of pharmaceuticals, extensive testing is required before a new 
compound will be admitted to the market by the Federal Drug 
Administration (FDA).  With a development cost of approximately 
$500 million for a new medicinal product,13 considerable economic 
interests are at stake.  Thus, numerous questions demand a more 
thorough analysis in the quest for the adequate legal treatment of 
experiments.  Are pharmaceuticals a special case?  Does that change the 
general policy on experimenting?  What is this policy?  What should it 
be?  If privileges for experimental conduct are to be granted, what 
should be deemed an experiment as opposed to plain infringement? 
Safeguarding the effect of a patented invention in the “global 
world”14 of today means not only being aware of domestic regulations 
but also considering foreign regulations that affect patent protection 
and the scope of possible defenses to infringement claims.  The defense 
that has been most frequently discussed and that is, at least for the 
pharmaceutical industry, likely to be the crucial point of practical patent 
protection is the safe harbor for experimental use, a provision that seeks 
to reconcile the problem mentioned above. 
Article 28(1) of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) Agreement states that a patent shall confer on its owner 
the right “to prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from 
the acts of:  making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing [the] 
 
12. Tanuja V. Garde, The Effect of Disparate Treatment of the Experimental Use 
Exemption on the Balancing Act of 35 U.S.C. § 104, 35 IIC 241, 242 (2004). 
13. Dr. Harvey E. Bale, Jr., Encouragement of New Clinical Drug Development:   
The Role of Data Exclusivity 1 (2000),  
http://www.ifpma.org/documents/NR643/DataExclusivity_2000.pdf. 
14. This is, of course, strictly speaking a pleonasm, yet used here to emphasize the 
increasingly intertwined and international character of business and commerce in the world. 
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product.”15  Thus, third-party activities with a patent are, generally 
speaking, not “experiments,” but plain infringement.16 
As an exception to that rule, Article 30 of the TRIPS states that 
“Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights 
conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not 
unreasonably . . . prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, 
taking into account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”17  The 
wording suggests that Member State legislators who are willing to 
address the issue have more than one option for complying with TRIPS. 
D.  Further Procedure of Analysis and Terminology 
Speaking of “experimental use,” two basic constructions have to be 
kept separate.  One is experimental use as an exception to public use 
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b),18 and the second is experimental use as a 
defense to patent infringement claims.  This form of experimental use is 
subdivided into common law experimental use (a controversial subject) 
and statutory experimental use. 
The terminology used for keeping these constructions separate is 
unfortunately different depending on the authority and sometimes even 
inconsistent within a single court. The Federal Circuit talks about “the 
experimental use and de minimis exceptions,”19 thereby obviously 
characterizing “experimental use exception” as the proper term for the 
exception to the § 102(b) statutory bar and “de minimis exception” as 
the proper term for the experimental use defense to patent infringement 
claims.  The same court also, however, uses the term “experimental use 
exemption” for the latter characterization.20  Referring to legislative 
materials, the court pointed out that “[35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)] has been 
coined an ‘exemption’ in the case law, drawing from terminology used in 
the legislative history.”21  However, those very materials used the term 
 
15. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197, art. 28(1) (1994) 
[hereinafter TRIPS]. 
16. The issue of the unfortunate terminology in the field of “experimental use” will be 
addressed in Part I.D. 
17. TRIPS, supra note 15, at art. 30. 
18. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). 
19. Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
20. See, e.g., Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA, 331 F.3d 860, 866 n.3 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) (citing Allergan, Inc. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 324 F.3d 1322, 1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
21. Integra, 331 F.3d at 866 n.3 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 5 (1984), reprinted 
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2689)). 
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“exception”22 as does the wording of Article 30 of TRIPS.23  In a recent 
article, the opposite terminology is suggested:  “[t]he experimental use 
exemption to the 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) public use . . . is distinct from the 
experimental use exception to patent infringement.”24  Prior to Merck 
KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.,25 the U.S. Supreme Court referred, 
like other courts,26 to the statutory patent infringement defense as the 
“clinical trial exemption.”27  It emphasized that the exemption was by no 
means only referring to clinical trials.28  An issue that will be addressed 
below. 
In this Article, the experimental use exception will stand for the 35 
U.S.C. § 102(b) public use bar and the experimental use exemption will 
stand for the statutory patent infringement defense.  This is not to say 
that no other terminology is possible.  Alternatively, a leading treatise 
on patent law describes the § 102(b) public use concept as the 
“experimental use negation,”29 an expression that can also be based on 
Federal Circuit precedent.30 
Strictly speaking, the statutory safe harbor should not be referred to 
as the “experimental use” exception/exemption/negation at all, because 
the word “experimental” does not correctly characterize the testing 
activity—not to explore unknown territories, but rather to confirm the 
bioequivalency of patented drugs.  As the British Court of Appeal 
stated in Monsanto Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co.,31 trials carried out for 
the purpose of demonstrating that “the product works as its maker 
claims were not to be regarded as acts done ‘for experimental 
 
22. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, at 5 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2689. 
23. See TRIPS, supra note 15, at art. 30. 
24. See Michelle Walters, De Minimis Use and Experimental Use Exceptions to Patent 
Infringement:  A Comment on the Embrex Concurrence, 29 AIPLA Q.J. 509, 510 n.1 (2001). 
25. 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005). 
26. See, e.g., Datascope Corp. v. Vascular Solutions, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 933, 935 (D. 
Minn. 2001); Intermedics v. Ventritex, Co., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Ann K. 
Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application of Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 and 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(e) 
(1994)), 180 A.L.R. FED. 487, 524 (2005). 
27. Datascope Corp., 165 F. Supp. 2d at 935 (emphasis added); see also Eli Lilly & Co. 
v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 676 (1990). 
28. Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2380–81 (2005). 
29. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 196 (2d 
ed. 2003) (emphasis added). 
30. See id. at 204–05 (citing Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 
1996)). 
31. Monsanto Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., [1985] R.P.C. 515, 1987 GRUR INT. 108 
(Eng.). 
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purposes.’” 32  If the U.S. Supreme Court itself had not declared the 
exemption to apply beyond the clinical trials phase, the more accurate 
wording would be its term, “clinical trial exemption.”  Accordingly, for 
reasons to be discussed in this Article, because this term is not 
appropriate for the more general German provisions, this term will not 
be used here.  In any event, it is of little benefit to discuss these widely 
semantic questions at length. 
Staying with the unfortunate term “experimental use” for all 
constructions requires that they all be briefly defined, even though the 
public use bar is not an issue here.  Thereafter, the relevant German 
provisions on experimental use and its implications will be explained in 
Part III, followed by a discussion of the differences and similarities 
between the U.S. and German provisions in Part IV.  The conclusion 
will follow under Part V.  A simplified chart outlining the major 
differences is in the Appendix. 
II.  EXPERIMENTAL USE IN U.S. PATENT LAW 
A.  Experimental Use as an Exception to the § 102(b) Statutory Bar 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines this form of “experimental-use 
exception” as “an exception to the public-use statutory bar, whereby an 
inventor is allowed to make public use of an invention for more than 
one year when that use is necessary to test and improve the invention.”33  
As early as 1877, the U.S. Supreme Court provided a broad foundation 
for experimental use in City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson 
Pavement Co.34 in which it allowed an inventor of a new road pavement 
to test it on the open street provided that he retained some form of 
control.35  This form of experimental use is not relevant for infringement 
claims and will not be pursued any further in this Article. 
B.  Common Law Experimental Use Exemption 
The second meaning of experimental use, and the only pertinent one 
for the purpose of this Article, is a special kind of de minimis 
infringement defense.  When talking about common law experimental 
use, the first question is whether this is an existing concept at all.  Judge 
 
32. Id. at 517, 1987 GRUR INT. at 110. 
33. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 619 (8th ed. 2004). 
34. 97 U.S. 126 (1877). 
35. Id. at 135–36. 
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Rader, in his often-cited concurrence in Embrex, Inc. v. Service 
Engineering Corp., argued that “the Patent Act leaves no room for any 
de minimis or [common law] experimental use excuses for 
infringement.”36  Judge Newman, on the other hand, feared that the 
Federal Circuit’s Integra opinion “disapproves and essentially eliminates 
the [existing] common law research exemption.”37  Despite Judge 
Newman’s explicit concerns, this issue has not been addressed by the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s recent ruling in that case.38 
As the following discussion will show, “common law de minimis 
infringement”—assuming it does exist—is currently being examined by 
U.S. courts through a highly theoretical approach.  Although such an 
experimental use exemption was promulgated by the judiciary as early 
as 1813,39 an exception focusing on what the Federal Circuit later 
described as a use performed “for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, 
or for strictly philosophical inquiry” does not constitute a practically 
applicable defense for the business-oriented players on the global stage 
of intellectual property.40 
In simplified terms, one can say that common law requires that “one 
cannot maintain an action for a wrongdoing where there is no 
damage.”41  For example, when no profit ensued from a patent violation, 
there are presumably no damages.42  Thus, “the experimental use 
exception does not protect experiments or tests which have a 
commercial purpose.”43  Cases in which courts allowed the alleged 
infringer to plead such a defense are “relatively rare,”44 amounting to 
“five cases in the history of the Republic.”45  Judge Newman argued that 
 
36. 216 F.3d at 1352. 
37. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA, 331 F.3d 860, 873 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
38. Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 passim (2005). 
39. See Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).  “[I]t could 
never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man who constructed such a 
machine merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the 
sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects.”  Id. 
40. Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
41. See Garde, supra note 12, at 243. 
42. See Byam v. Bullard, 4 F. Cas. 934 (C.C.D. Mass. 1852) (quoting Whittemore v. 
Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813)). 
43. Ares-Serono, Inc. v. Organon Int’l B.V., 862 F. Supp. 603, 608 (D. Mass. 1994). 
44. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 845. 
45. David Carney, Supreme Court Takes Case Involving Research Exemption to Patent 
Infringement, TECH. L.J. § 7 (Jan. 7, 2005),  
http://www.techlawjournal.com/topstories/2005/20050107.asp (quoting Judge Rader from an 
unpublished source). 
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“philosophical” indeed meant “scientific”46 and that the wording 
warrants a broader understanding.  This controversy will be discussed in 
Part V. 
The Federal Circuit’s construction of the experimental use exception 
leaves only non-commercial use, a phenomenon hardly found in 
practice.  Even universities cannot be presumed to be “ivory towers,” 
detached and separated from profit-oriented thinking, especially after 
the passage of the Bayh-Doyl Act.47  In fact, universities are very much 
in the business of research, and many are generating substantial 
revenues for experiments or earning considerable royalties from patents 
in the commercial sector.48  The Federal Circuit has recently declined to 
hold that university research is exempt from patent infringement.49  
Reaffirming Judge Newman’s concerns, one scholar observed, “[t]his 
holding severely limited, to the point of near elimination, the common 
law experimental use defense.”50 
This is a valid point considering that Duke University, in its writ of 
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, stated that private universities 
could never benefit from experimental use because all of their research 
is in furtherance of their legitimate business objectives; whereas—
although absurd in the eyes of Duke University—commercial 
enterprises could lawfully engage in simply experimental research.51  It 
did not grant certiorari,52 demonstrating that the point made by Duke 
University did not significantly concern the U.S. Supreme Court.53  That 
 
46. As Judge Newman pointed out in her concurring in part, dissenting in part opinion 
to Integra, the “philosophical” experiment refers to “natural philosophy,” which is commonly 
understood as “science” today.  See Garde, supra note 12, at 243 n.10. 
47. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3019–28 (1980) (codified as 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 
(2000)).  The Act seeks “to promote collaboration between commercial concerns and 
nonprofit organizations, including universities.”  Id. 
48. See Ted Agres, Columbia Patents under Attack, THE SCIENTIST, July 25, 2003, 
available at http://www.the-scientist.com/news/20030725/03.  “Five large biotech and 
pharmaceutical companies are accusing Columbia University of having illegally extended the 
life of key DNA patents to maintain highly lucrative licensing revenues.  The patents have 
brought the university between $300 and $400 million in licensing royalties over the past 2 
decades.”  Id. 
49. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
50. Garde, supra note 12, at 246. 
51. See Brief of Petitioner at 13, Duke Univ. v. Madey, 539 U.S. 958 (2003) (No. 02-
1007). 
52. Duke Univ. v. Madey, 539 U.S. 958 (2003). 
53. The fact that certiorari was granted in Integra may affect this issue as well, but a 
general exemption for university research as a per se non-business research is (rightfully so, in 
light of the commercial nature) not warranted. 
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being said, Part II.C discusses the only defensive tools reasonably 
applicable to commercial use—those created by statute. 
The German Federal Supreme Court took a similar stand54 in its 
landmark opinion Clinical Tests II (Klinische Versuche II).55  It pointed 
to the impossibility of differentiating between purely academic and 
commercial research.56  It also highlighted that, in practice, 
biotechnological research will mostly be carried out by commercial 
enterprises or universities because of high costs.57  It concluded that the 
research efforts of the latter are also commonly driven by commercial 
interests.58 
C.  Statutory Experimental Use Exemption:  The Hatch-Waxman Act 
Yet another, and the most relevant, understanding of experimental 
use is the statutory de minimis infringement provision.  On September 
24, 1984, President Reagan signed into law the Drug Price Competition 
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,59 commonly referred to as the 
Hatch-Waxman Act.60 
 The Hatch-Waxman Act provides for an abbreviated 
approval process for generic forms of previously approved 
pioneer drug products whose patents have or will soon expire or 
are proven invalid.  A pharmaceutical company seeking approval 
to market a generic product must complete an Abbreviated New 
Drug Application (“ANDA”). . . . The ANDA applicant may 
rely upon the pioneer company’s tests.  It need only prove that 
the generic contains the same active ingredient as, and is 
bioequivalent to, the patented drug.61 
 
54. The outcome of that case was of course different, but for other reasons discussed 
in Part III.C. 
55. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Apr. 17, 1997, 1997 NJW 
3092, [1998] R.P.C. 423 (F.R.G.). 
56. Id. at 3095, [1998] R.P.C. at 433. 
57. Id., [1998] R.P.C. at 437. 
58. Id., [1998] R.P.C. at 437–38. 
59. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-417, 
98 Stat. 1585 (1984).  For a detailed discussion of all aspects of this statute, see Wooster, supra 
note 26, at 487. 
60. The commonly referred to name of the Act refers to its co-sponsors, Senator Orrin 
Hatch (R-UT) and Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA). 
61. See Zenith Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., No. 98-1661, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22567 
at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 5, 1996). 
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The Act provided the first and only62 specific research-use exemption 
in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), which provides as follows: 
 It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to 
sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United 
States a patented invention (other than a new animal drug or 
veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 
1913) which is primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, 
recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes 
involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely for 
uses reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, 
use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.63 
“Under a literal interpretation of patent law, it is clear that ‘research 
exemption’-type of activities are literal infringements . . . .”64  Congress 
explicitly exempted certain infringing activities from the scope of the 
patent protection for policy considerations. 
As Judge Nies observed in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.,65 
“section 271(e)(1) was added to overrule this court’s decision in 
Roche.”66  In Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals Co.,67 the 
Federal Circuit held that experimental use did not encompass the use of 
a patented compound for federally mandated pre-marketing tests even 
if the new drug (here, the one marketed by Bolar) would not enter the 
market prior to patent expiration.68  The legislature agreed with the 
pharmaceutical company’s argument that patents will, under the Roche 
rule, be de facto extended if competitors must wait on mandatory 
bioequivalency tests until the patents expire.69 
 
62. “Only” refers to the “only one applicable in the context of patents.”  Id.  There is 
another statutory research exemption that deals with the use and reproduction of protected 
plant varieties.  See 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (2000).  Section 2544 provides that “[t]he use and 
reproduction of a protected variety for plant breeding or other bona fide research shall not 
constitute an infringement of the protection provided under this Act.”  Id. 
63. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). 
64. Lauren C. Bruzzone, The Research Exemption:  A Proposal, 21 AIPLA Q. J. 52, 54 
(1993). 
65. 872 F.2d 402 (Fed. Cir. 1989), aff’d, 496 U.S. 661 (1990). 
66. Id. at 406. 
67. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
68. Id. at 860–61. 
69. For a more detailed analysis of the underlying policy considerations, see Bruzzone, 
supra note 64, at 54. 
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D.  Scope of Experimental Use Provision 
In the United States, courts have generally conceded that the use of 
a patented invention solely to develop generic drugs for purposes of 
FDA approval does not constitute infringement.70  However, this very 
broad statement does not help in comparing U.S. and German 
provisions; instead, it compels a closer look at the statutory language. 
Both legislative concepts provide a safe harbor from infringement if 
the experiment “relates” (or “reasonably relates” under U.S. law) to 
admission of a compound under U.S. law or the patented subject matter 
itself under German law.  Needless to say, this “relationship” is open to 
interpretation as to when infringement is considered “reasonable.” 
The most commonly applied test is whether a reasonable defendant 
would have believed that there was “a decent prospect that the use in 
question would contribute to the generation of the kind of information 
that was likely to be relevant in the processes by which the FDA would 
decide whether to approve the product.”71  That does not, however, 
answer the question, because it is unclear what information a party may 
believe to be relevant and what information it may not believe to be 
relevant. 
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California took 
a very narrow approach in Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. 
Gentech, Inc.,72 holding that experimental use was limited to 
bioequivalency tests for FDA approval and, thus, did not, as the 
defendant asserted, cover all uses “reasonably related to FDA testing,” 
but only use solely related to obtaining data for bioequivalency testing 
mandated by FDA rules.73 
This approach finds support among some scholars: 
 On its face, the [U.S.] exemption appears to be very broad, 
applying to a wide range of potential infringers and activities.  
The legislative history, however, indicates that Congress was 
concerned with a very narrow class of infringers and range of 
activities.  Specifically, the legislative history indicates that the 
 
70. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 534 (D.N.J. 2002), 
aff’d on other grounds, 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
71. See Wooster, supra note 26, at 525 (citing In re ‘639 Patent Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 
2d 157 (D. Mass. 2001)). 
72. 666 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
73. Id. at 1396. 
RUESS - ARTICLE - FORMATTED 4/24/2006  6:51:43 AM 
2006] ACCEPTING EXCEPTIONS? 93 
 
exception was only meant to protect bioequivalency testing by 
generic manufacturers.74 
One can well argue whether this holding went beyond the intention 
of Congress, because the statute explicitly states that the exemption 
shall apply to “solely all uses reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the 
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.”75  That was exactly what the 
defendant asked the court to hold. 
This viewpoint, in the eyes of the author, cannot be rebutted merely 
by asserting the legislative intent and invoking the general principle that 
experimental use be construed “very narrowly.”76  As the U.S. Supreme 
Court held, “[i]t is not the law that a statute can have no effects which 
are not explicitly mentioned in its legislative history.”77  Congressional 
intent, thus, does not necessarily limit a statute to its language. 
A limitation to bioequivalency testing for FDA approval does seem 
unwarranted by law.  Congress would have chosen a different wording if 
it meant to narrow the statute in this way.  The wording of § 271(e)(1), 
especially by stressing “all uses” and “development and submission,” 
suggests that the Northern District of California somehow went beyond 
Congress’ intent.  As the U.S. Supreme Court established, courts cannot 
generally override the statutory wording if it is clear:  “[A judge’s] 
inquiry must cease if . . . ‘the statutory scheme is coherent and 
consistent.’”78  However, that might not exactly be the case.  The statute 
is, in the words of Judge Nies, “fraught with ambiguity.”79  That question 
does not need to be pursued in depth though, because the Northern 
District of California reverted to the more commonly used standards in 
Intermedics, stating that the applicable test was whether the defendant 
could reasonably believe in a “decent prospect” of its conduct to 
generate information relevant for FDA approval.80  In the same opinion, 
 
74. William S. Feiler & Paula K. Wittmayer, Protecting Research to Develop Drugs, 229 
N.Y. L.J. 9 (2003). 
75. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). 
76. See Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing 
Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
77. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronics, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669 n.2 (1990) (quoting Pittston 
Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 115 (1988)). 
78. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (quoting United States v. Ron 
Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)). 
79. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402, 405 (Fed. Cir. 1989), aff’d, 496 U.S. 
661 (1990). 
80. See Intermedics v. Ventritex, Co., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
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the court held that the experimental use exemption also applied to 
medical devices.81 
The Federal Circuit’s latest statements on experimental use are to be 
found in the recently vacated Integra opinion.82  Integra held a patent for 
a certain polypeptide sequence; Merck used this compound for research 
purposes.83  Merck asserted § 271(e)(1) as a defense because it was using 
the drug to search for new drugs that would be subject to FDA 
approval.84  The Federal Circuit held that Merck was not eligible for the 
§ 271(e)(1) defense because “general biomedical research aimed 
towards identifying new compounds”85 was not what Congress 
warranted by creating a safe harbor for generic drugs.  In the words of 
Judge Rader, “§ 271(e)(1) simply does not globally embrace all 
experimental activity that at some point, however attenuated, may lead 
to an [sic] FDA approval process.”86 
Basic scientific research on a particular compound, performed 
without the intent to develop a particular drug or a reasonable 
belief that the compound will cause the sort of physiological 
effect the researcher intends to induce, is surely not reasonably 
related to the development and submission of information to the 
FDA.87 
However, the court voted for a broader understanding of the Hatch-
Waxman Act:  “It does not follow from this, however, that the § 
271(e)(1)’s exemption from infringement categorically excludes either 
(1) experimentation on drugs that are not ultimately the subject of an 
FDA submission or (2) use of patented compounds in experiments that 
are not ultimately submitted to the FDA.”88  Thus, it did not only come 
out on the side of Merck but also sided with the U.S. government.  The 
acting Solicitor General, along with several other government leaders, 
filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the United States89 expressing 
discomfort with the holding of the Federal Circuit and arguing that the 
decision “will likely hinder the development of important and medically 
 
81. Id. at 1272. 
82. Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 passim (2005). 
83. Id. at 2377–78. 
84. Id. at 2378–79. 
85. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA, 331 F.3d 860, 866 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
86. Id. at 867. 
87. Merck KGAA, 125 S. Ct. at 2382 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
88. Id. 
89. Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 20, Merck 
KGAA v. Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03-1237). 
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valuable new drugs.”90  Section 271(e)(1), as construed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, leaves “simply no room . . . for excluding certain 
information from the exemption on the basis of the phase of research in 
which it is developed or the particular submission in which it could be 
included.”91 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s construction of § 271(e)(1) is, as the 
following explanations will show, closer to the German understanding 
than the Federal Circuit’s opinion. 
III.  EXPERIMENTAL USE IN GERMAN PATENT LAW 
German patent law provides for general protection of the 
patent/patentee in a similar way the protection works in U.S. law; 
however, as a civil law country, these protections are provided solely 
through statutes.92  Sections 9 and 10 of the German Patent Act (PatG) 
are entitled “Effect of the Patent” (“Wirkung des Patents”).93  Section 9 
prohibits direct use by third parties and § 10 prohibits indirect use by 
third parties.94  Similar to U.S. patent law, third parties are not only 
restricted from using the patented product, but are also restricted from 
producing, offering for sale, or placing into commerce a product that 
falls within the scope of the patented subject matter.95  Exemptions are 
now set out in § 11, which is expressively entitled “Restrictions of the 
Effect of the Patent” (“Beschränkung der Wirkung des Patents”).96 
A.  The 1968 Patent Act 
Before experimental use was explicitly covered in the 1981 PatG, § 6 
of the statutory predecessor, the 1968 PatG,97 contained a rather 
ambiguous wording construed by most authorities in a way to allow 
experimental conduct as long as the experiment constituted an action in 
 
90. Carney, supra note 45, at 2. 
91. Merck KGAA, 125 S. Ct. at 2380. 
92. For the sake of consistency, the symbol “§” is used for both U.S. and German 
codifications although—widely unknown even among scholars—it does not mean “section,” 
but “paragraph” throughout Europe.  However, in Europe, a paragraph is not the sub-
element of a section, but vice versa; thus, using the sign as opposed to the more commonly 
pursued approach of omitting the sign in international documents and using the word 
“section” is preferable.  Accordingly, “§ 9 PatG” would be referred to by any European 
lawyer as “paragraph 9,” but has the meaning of “section 9” in the U.S. law context. 
93. Patentgesetz [Patent Act], Dec. 18, 1980, BGBl. I, §§ 9, 10 (F.R.G.). 
94. Id. 
95. See id. 
96. Id. § 11. 
97. Patentgesetz [Patent Act], Jan. 2, 1968, BGBl. I, § 6 (F.R.G.). 
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the private sphere without further commercial motivation.98  This did not 
allow economic use of the invention, but restricted tests to acts of 
private use, that is, verification that the patented invention was working 
properly and pure laboratory testing.99 
The German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) held in 
Ethofumesat100 that third party use constituted an infringement when the 
third parties used an herbicide product containing the patented active 
substance in field tests during the term of the patent to explore whether 
the substance was effective, not injurious to human health, and 
environmentally friendly.101 
According to the German Federal Court’s construction of the 1968 
PatG, which still applied to that particular case, such experiments were 
exempt if the sole purpose was to improve the invention.  Because the 
experiments in question served to obtain data necessary to ensure 
compliance with the Federal Agency for Drugs and Pharmaceuticals 
(BfAPharm)102 approval procedure and not to improve the invention, 
this conduct was not covered by the experimental use exemption.  A 
leading commentary on the PatG stated that only scientific experiments 
were admissible103—an opinion not upheld in later editions after the 
modification of the 1981 PatG.104 
 
98. “[E]ine Handlung im privaten Bereich ohne weitergehende ‘gewerbliche Zwecke.’”  
Peter Chrocziel, Zulassungshandlungen mit patentierten Arzneimittelerfindungen durch 
Zweitanmelder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und den USA [Admission Activities with 
Patented Drug Inventions by Second Applicants in the Federal Republic of Germany and in the 
U.S.], 1984 GRUR INT. 735, 738. 
99. See Ingve B. Stjerna, Die Voraussetzungen und Grenzen des patentrechtlichen 
Versuchsprivilegs [Preconditions and Borders of the Experimental Use Exemption in Patent 
Law], 2004 GRUR 343, 344 (referencing applicable case law); Thomas Hieber, Die 
Zulaessigkeit von Versuchen an patentierten Erfindungen nach § 11 Nr. 2 PatG [Admissibility 
of Experiments with Patented Inventions Pursuant to § 11(2) of the Patent Act], 1996 GRUR 
439, 440. 
100. Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Supreme Court], Feb. 18, 1992, 107 
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 46 (F.R.G.), 1990 GRUR 
997. 
101. Id. 
102. Federal Agency for Drugs and Pharmaceuticals (Bundesanstalt für Arzneimittel 
und Pharmaprodukte) is the German equivalent of the United States’ Food and Drug 
Administration (but only supervising medicinal products).  There is also the Federal Health 
Agency (Bundesgesundheitsamt) with its own expertise. 
103. Georg Benkard, Annotation, Patentgesetz und Gebrauchsmustergesetz [Patent Act 
and Design Patent Act], Patentgesetz [Patent Act], Dec. 18, 1980, BGBl. I, §§ 9, 10 (F.R.G.) 
(as amended by Law of Dec. 20, 1991) (argument upheld until 7th ed.). 
104. See Georg Benkard, Annotation, Patentgesetz und Gebrauchsmustergesetz [Patent 
Act and Design Patent Act], Patentgesetz [Patent Act], Dec. 18, 1980, BGBl. I, §§ 9, 10 
(F.R.G.) (as amended by Law of Mar. 23, 1993) (argument upheld until 9th ed.). 
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B.  The 1981 Patent Act 
The reason for including an explicit experimental use exemption in 
the PatG was that compliance with European Union harmonization 
efforts had to be reached.  Section 11(2) of the 1981 PatG is derived 
from the ratification of the Convention for the European Patent for the 
Common Market (Gemeinschaftspatentübereinkommen) (CPC).105  
Article 31(b) exempts from liability for patent infringement all “acts 
done for experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the 
patented invention.”106  This provision was introduced almost verbatim 
into most European national laws.107  “Of the original signatories of the 
Community Patent Convention, The Federal Republic of Germany, 
France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Spain, and Denmark have 
amended their patent laws to essentially copy the provisions of the 
Act.”108 
In Germany, the CPC rules became part of the 1981 PatG.109  As 
amended in 1981, they now provide that the effect of a patent should 
not reach “acts for experimental purposes that relate to the subject 
matter of the patented invention.”110  It should be noted that the present 
PatG will soon be amended again, mainly because of Germany’s 
obligation to implement the EC Biotechnology Directive into national 
law.  The draft of the Act for the Introduction of the Directive on the 
Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions111 does not, however, 
provide for any alterations of the existing experimental use exemption; 
thus, the present wording will remain unchanged. 
C.  Scope of Experimental Use Provision 
The scope of § 11(2) of the PatG had been subject to discussion 
among lower courts and scholars alike.  The Landgericht Berlin, as 
 
105. Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market, Dec. 15, 1975, 
BGBl. II, 833 (F.R.G.), 15 I.L.M. 5 (1976) [hereinafter CPC]. 
106. Id. at art. 31(b) (renumbered as art. 27(b) in Dec. 15, 1989 amendment). 
107. Especially the Netherlands form an exception here, as the pertinent wording of 
the Dutch Patent Law 1995, Article 53(3) reads as follows:  “The exclusive right shall not 
extend to acts solely serving for research on the patented subject-matter, including the 
product obtained directly as a result of using the patented process.”  See Cornish, supra note 
11, at 736. 
108. See Bruzzone, supra note 64, at 62 (footnotes omitted). 
109. Patentgesetz [Patent Act], Dec. 18, 1980, BGBl. I, §§ 11(2) (F.R.G.)  
110. This is a translation of the German wording, which reads as follows:  “Die 
Wirkung des Patents erstreckt sich nicht auf Handlungen zu Versuchszwecken, die sich auf 
den Gegenstand der patentierten Erfindung beziehen.” 
111. BTDrucks 14/5642. 
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court of first instance,112 argued that § 11(2) is simply to be seen as a 
codification of case law regarding the 1968 version of § 6;113 thus, the 
principles stated under Part III.A. apply.  However, the Federal 
Supreme Court has taken a much more liberal approach in two 
landmark decisions. 
1.  Federal Supreme Court, Clinical Trials I 
In Clinical Trials I,114 the plaintiff was the exclusive licensee of a 
patent that covered human immune interferon, the so-called interferon 
gamma.115  One of the defendants imported the active ingredient and 
used it to produce “Polyferon,” a pharmaceutical approved by the 
Federal Public Health Department for the treatment of chronic 
polyarthritis, the classic rheumatoid arthritis.116  He sold it to another 
defendant who distributed the “Polyferon.”117 The defendants were 
conducting clinical studies with the patented substance with a view to 
identify additional, conceivable indications.118 
The Federal Supreme Court, in the words of Supreme Court Judge 
Professor Dr.  Meier-Beck, “rejected a recourse to the decisions made 
under the Patent Act of 1968, including the ‘Ethofumesat’-decision . . . . 
[Its] main considerations were the following:  [§ 11(2)] had no 
corresponding provision in the previous statutes, and the provision was 
adopted almost verbatim from the Community Patent Convention.”119 
According to Judge Meier-Beck, this shows that the “German 
legislative body [did not simply want] to codify existing national law and 
jurisdiction.”120 
 Therewith—as the Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Court of 
Justice] says—the exempted tests were not defined positively but 
 
112. Under German civil procedure rules, a Landgericht is court of first instance in all 
civil actions exceeding 5000 Euro in value, and in special cases such as patent and trademark 
actions.  In all civil actions not exceeding 5000 Euro in value, the Landgericht sits as a Court 
of Appeals. 
113. Klinischer Test [Clinical Test], 1985 GRUR 375, 376 (LG Berlin). 
114. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], July 11, 1995, 1996 GRUR 
109, [1997] R.P.C. 623 (F.R.G.). 
115. Id. at 109, [1997] R.P.C. at 629. 
116. Id. at 110, [1997] R.P.C. at 630–31. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Peter Meier-Beck, Clinical Trials and the Patent Law’s Test Privilege, at 4, 
http://www.italy.les-europe.org/docs/meier.pdf (lasted visited Jan. 21, 2005) (emphasis 
added). 
120. Id. 
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a negative delimitation was given:  Any activities are excluded 
from test privilege which use an invention as the means for 
experimental acts; in such cases the invention is no longer used 
for purposes of experimentation. 
 . . . . 
 Accordingly, the wording of [§ 11(2)] of the Patent Act and 
the legislative speak for the assumption that clinical trials are 
exempted (enjoy the test privilege) even when the patented 
active substance is used with the objective of finding whether 
and, where appropriate, with what form of administration and 
dosage it is able to cure or alleviate certain human diseases.  
These trials are exempted as a matter of principle, regardless 
whether, beyond the pure research character of the trials, 
economic interests are also in the background, which can anyway 
hardly ever be ruled out.121 
Judge Meier-Beck also expressed his view that the Federal Supreme 
Court’s decision in Clinical Trials I is in accord with the decision of the 
British Court of Appeal in Monsanto.122  “Therefor, [sic] the 
admissibility of clinical tests is [not] barred by the [fact] that these test[s] 
are typically carried out with the further objective of obtaining 
[regulatory] approval.”123 
This decision was affirmed124 by the Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht), holding that the Federal Supreme Court’s 
construction of § 11(2) did not violate the constitutional property 
guarantee set out in Article 14 of the German Constitution 
(Grundgesetz).125 
2.  Federal Supreme Court, Clinical Trials II 
In Clinical Tests II,126 the Federal Supreme Court was confronted 
with the following fact pattern:  clinical trials were performed with a 
preparation containing recombinant human erythropoietin (EPO) to 
confirm results obtained in animal tests and to generate data required 
 
121. Id. at 4–5 (translation added). 
122. [1985] R.P.C. 515, 1987 GRUR INT 108 (Eng.). 
123. Meier-Beck, supra note 119, at 5. 
124. Procedurally, what happened is called “nonacceptance of a constitutional 
complaint” (“Nichtan-nahme einer Verfassungsbeschwerde”), which is similar to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s denial of a writ of certiorari. 
125. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], May 10, 
2000, 1 BvR 1864/95, 2001 NJW 1783. 
126. Bundesgerichtoshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Apr. 17, 1997, 1997 NJW 
3092, [1998] R.P.C. 423 (F.R.G.). 
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for regulatory approval.127  It welcomed the occasion to confirm its 
holding in Clinical Test I: 
As [§ 11(2) of the PatG] neither qualitatively nor quantitatively 
limits the experimental activities . . . . According wording of the 
law it is [not relevant whether the tests yield] scientifically or 
commercially usable results, or whether the test of a protected 
active agent achieves the aim of obtaining data of legal 
pharmaceutical permission . . . . [The only requirement is that the 
tests are intended to yield information related to the patented 
subject matter.] . . . This is also the situation if—as in the case in 
dispute—a pharmaceutical compound which contains the 
protected active agent should be tested in a clinical experiment 
with regards to its effectiveness and digestibility.  [It is not 
evident from the wording of the provision that it would exclude 
an economical orientation or commercial objective of the 
experimental conduct.]128 
The Federal Supreme Court did find, as it had not found in Clinical 
Trials I, that the trials conducted solely for obtaining regulatory 
approval do qualify for the experimental use exemption.  “[T]he 
plaintiff is not successfully able to validate a differentiation between 
research activities which serve to develop further and improve an active 
agent protected by patent and such activities which have as their 
purpose the fulfilment of the regulations for authorisation.”129 
One may think that this is self-evident, because the German 
provisions so far do extend beyond the scope of Hatch-Waxman Act.  
But, at least prima facie, ambiguous messages in that respect still seem 
to be sent by members of the Federal Supreme Court’s Tenth Senate.  
Judge Meier-Beck posed the following questions: 
This may really be the decisive question:  Were the trials, apart 
from other intentions, also aimed at exploring the unknown and 
bringing out new facts or solving remaining uncertainties?  If yes, 
the test privilege is applicable.  Or is demonstrating well-known 
facts to the competent authority the sole intention of the tests?  
If this is the case, the tests are not privileged trials in accordance 
with [§ 11(2)] of the 1981 Patent Act.130 
 
127. Id. at 3092, [1998] R.P.C. at 427–30. 
128. Id. at 3096, [1998] R.P.C. at 433. 
129. Id. at 3095, [1998] R.P.C. at 436 (citing Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court 
of Justice], July 11, 1995, 1996 GRUR 109, [1997] R.P.C. 623 (F.R.G.)). 
130. Meier-Beck, supra note 119, at 9. 
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This view is shared by another prominent member of the Tenth Senate, 
Judge Alfred Keukenschrijver.131 
The quotation above certainly raises questions as to the very idea of 
generic manufacturing, the questions to which Judge Meier-Beck 
provided a quite vague answer.  “It is a question of fact which is the 
right one of these categories for tests necessary to obtain regulatory 
approval for a generic product.  I do not dare to answer this, as I simply 
lack sufficient expert knowledge on this field of technology.”132 
The aforementioned remarks are somewhat confusing and should be 
clarified.  Whenever a generic producer aims to design around a 
patented product and uses the patented product to obtain regulatory 
approval, he shall be exempt from infringement under German (and 
U.S.) law.  The Federal Supreme Court simply held that experiments 
are not subject to the experimental use safe harbor if they serve solely 
to verify business questions, such as whether there is a demand in the 
market or an acceptance of price ranges or distribution channels.133 
The Federal Supreme Court certainly did not, and did not mean to, 
exclude tests for obtaining regulatory approval, which have to be seen as 
within the scope—if not at the heart—of § 11(2), even when they do not 
reveal new facts.  This approach is visible in the Landgericht’s holding in 
Clinical Trials II. 
The Landgericht, as a court of first instance, found that testing for 
the purposes of regulatory marketing approval was not within the scope 
of § 11(2), a point the Federal Supreme Court expressively dismissed as 
discussed earlier. 
Moreover, in Clinical Trials II, the Federal Supreme Court stated an 
important difference between Clinical Trials I and II. 
[In contrast to Clinical Trials I], it is here not a matter of the 
discovery of further indications, rather of facts concerning the 
characteristics of the active agent in accordance with the patent 
in the context of the well-known indications.  These experiments 
are activities which are related to the object of the invention.134 
 
131. See Alfred Keukenschrijver, 2002 MITT. DT. PA. 2, 5 (2002). 
132. Meier-Beck, supra note 119, at 9. 
133. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Apr. 17, 1997, 1997 
NJW 3092, 3094, [1998] R.P.C. 423, 433–34 (F.R.G.). 
134. Id., [1998] R.P.C. at 431. 
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IV.  DEFINITION AND INTERPRETATION OF DIFFERENCES 
A.  Differences in Statutory Wording 
Comparing the German and U.S. provisions, it becomes apparent 
that each provision is both broader and narrower than the respective 
other statute.  In total, the U.S. provision contains the more detailed, 
and, thus, much more restrictive approach. 
The German provision only allows experiments relating to the 
patented subject matter; the meaning of such a restriction will be 
discussed later.  Hatch-Waxman Act provides, in pertinent part, for no 
such restriction, but requires experiments to reasonably relate to 
regulatory admissions under federal law, which can be simplified by the 
term “relating to FDA approval only.”  This, of course, is a very severe 
restriction that excludes testing in any respect not related to FDA 
approval, leaving entire industrial branches with no need to obtain a “go 
ahead” from the FDA.  That being said, the only situation in which the 
U.S. regulation would be broader than the German counterpart could 
be an experiment required by the FDA but not relating to the patented 
subject matter.  Under a reasonable construction of the term “relate,” 
this is a rather theoretical case.  The U.S. regulation further excludes 
new animal drugs and certain veterinary biological products, which are 
described very precisely in the statute.135  The PatG contains no 
restriction regarding the eligible subject matter. 
B.  Evaluation of Differences 
In Germany, the term “relate” enjoys a rather broad construction.  
Shortly after § 11(2) was introduced, the majority of scholars and 
practitioners read the statute in such a way that all experimental 
conduct with patented subject matter was permissible and the limitation 
“relating to the subject matter of the patented product” simply excluded 
experiments if the aim of the tests was to obtain information about 
marketability of the patented invention or in which the patented 
compound was used as an “apparatus” to test something different.136 
 
135. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). 
136. See e.g., Peter Chrocziel, Die Bneutzung patentierter Erfindungen zu Versuchs-und 
Forschungszwecken [Use of Patented Inventions for Experimental and Research Purposes], 
1986 GRUR 148, 195.  See also Rudolf Teschemacher, Biotechnologiche Erfindungen in der 
Erteilungspraxis des Europäischen Patentamtes [Biological Inventions in the Prosecution 
Practice of the European Patent Office], 1987 GRUR INT. 303, 303–10. 
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An example for the latter “apparatus” test would be to use a 
patented refrigerator in order to examine the effect of very low 
temperatures on certain (other) products.  An experiment relating to 
the patented subject matter would be validly conducted when the 
refrigerator is used in the same way, but in a way to see how efficiently 
the refrigerator cools other products.137 
In the opinion of the author, this very fine (or, in a less positive 
perception, artificial) delineation provokes misuse.  As the above 
example shows, impermissible and permissible action are just two sides 
of the same process.  On the other hand, those tests are not primarily 
about simply obtaining information (that is, how efficiently can the 
refrigerator cool my product).  If the information is necessary for 
authorities, then secretly obtained data does not help.  Because test 
results have to be submitted, the illegal conduct thereby will be 
disclosed, which devalues the incentive for circumvention. 
Although one may sometimes overestimate the differences between 
civil and common law systems, courts are even less likely and less able 
to introduce additional bars or requirements when facing somewhat 
clear statutory language in civil law countries.  That being said, the only 
limitations of experimental use in Germany are those which can be 
extracted from the wording of § 11(2).  Because there is no such thing as 
an additional common law experimental use and the statute does not 
provide for a different treatment of commercially motivated 
experiments, there is no difference between commercial and 
noncommercial conduct under German patent law. 
V.  CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
It has been frequently said that comparisons without evaluation are 
of limited value.  A leading treatise on comparative law makes a valid 
point in stating that the “comparatist’s power and duty to make a critical 
evaluation [of the analysis, otherwise] comparative law can easily 
degenerate into a dizzying spiral in which everything is both cause and 
effect; different from, but similar to, anything else; separate but 
intertwined.”138 
On the other hand, this should not lead the reader to believe that 
there is a “winner” to be declared whose system has to be copied by the 
“loser.”  In the opinion of the author, the approach of a good 
 
137. See as an example Gottfried Freier, Patentverletz-ung und Versuchsprivileg 
[Patent Infringement and Experimental Use Exemption], 1987 GRUR 664, 666. 
138. GLENDON ET AL., supra note 4, at 8. 
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comparison should be rather biblical—literally biblical if applying the 
word of St. Paul:  “Probe everything and retain the best.”139  So what is 
“the best”?  What has to be retained?  That, of course, depends on the 
aim that is pursued by the legislator.  In the following discussion, the 
author will show that the U.S. and the German legislator, although 
prima facie developing solutions to the identical task of promoting “the 
Progress of Science and Useful Arts,”140 were seeking to reach quite 
different objectives. 
As evident from the discussion above, the experimental use defense 
is broader under German law than under U.S. law.  There may be 
several reasons why the compromise has been struck differently in the 
United States than in Germany.  The most apparent one is that the 
benefit to the public is weighed differently.  As Judge Rader stated in 
the Integra, the Hatch-Waxman Act was “designed to benefit the 
makers of generic drugs, research-based pharmaceutical companies, and 
not incidentally the public.”141  Although the government’s interest in low 
drug costs might well have played a role in the already discussed 
reversal of this opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court, this does not change 
the general approach.  According to another opinion of the Federal 
Circuit, “Congress struck a balance between two competing policy 
interests:  (1) inducing pioneering research and development of new 
drugs and (2) enabling competitors to bring low-cost, generic copies of 
those drugs to market.”142 
That being said, it is obvious that, under U.S. law, only two parties 
and their interests had to be reconciled, and public factors are 
considered as “secondary effects” only.143  Whereas, in Germany, one 
can make the argument that the public interest directly weighs in on the 
side of the generic drug manufacturers. 
Although there is no specific reference to the public good in the 
statute, numerous scholars have elaborated on the public good as a 
 
139. 1 Thessalonians 5:21. 
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  The German legislative aim is equivalent, yet not 
codified on a constitutional level. 
141. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGAA, 331 F.3d 860, 865 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(quoting Glaxo, Inc. v. Novapharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 162, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997)) (emphasis 
added). 
142. Allergan, Inc. v. Alcon Labs., 324 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Andrx 
Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002)) (emphasis added). 
143. For a broader view on the role of public interest in patent cases with special focus 
on the biotechnology sector, see Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public 
Interest as a Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389 (2002).  
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factor to consider in construing the experimental use defense.144  As 
Professor Straus pointed out,145 the “legitimate interest of the public in 
information relevant for improving medical care depends upon the 
clinical testing.”146  In this context, he described the interests of the 
public and the interest of the applicant for the new patent as being “in 
accord.”147  It is evident that, in developing a compromise between 
interests, the acknowledgement of a public good factor weighing in on 
one side of the scale in German law left less room for the interests of the 
patentees than under the U.S. system. 
As the course of research revealed, the most significant factor is a 
totally different approach of the legislature; Congress simply did not 
want to create a general experimental use defense.  Section 271(e)(1) 
took a very specialized approach and simply aimed to overcome the 
problem created (or, to be fair, visualized) by the Federal Circuit in 
Roche.  Scholars in this country have been criticizing this point of view 
and argued in favor of a general experimental use exception;148 whereas 
others argue that “an exception allowing experimental use of another 
person’s invention should only be allowed if the overall social utility 
increases.”149 
The German provision, on the other hand, explicitly represents a 
general experimental use defense, as it is also known in Japan and most 
European countries.150  It covers experiments conducted with a 
commercial motivation, allows research for not only existing and new 
indications,151 and does not restrict clinical trials for regulatory approval.  
 
144. See, e.g., Jochen Pagenberg, Das Versuchsprivileg des § 11 Nr. 2 PatG [The 
Experimental Use Exemption in § 11(2) of the Patent Act], 1996 GRUR 736; Hieber, supra 
note 99, at 445; Joseph Straus, Zur Zulaessigkeit klinischer Untersuchungen am Gegenstand 
abhaengiger Verbesserungserfindungen [To the Admissibility of Clinical Trials with Dependent 
Improvement Inventions], 1993 GRUR 308, 318. 
145. Straus, supra note 144, at 318. 
146. Professor Straus’ strong emphasis on public good has recently been criticized by 
Rolf Pietzcker, who argues for stronger patent protection and narrow construction of § 11(2).  
Rolf Pietzcker, Patentrechtliche Fragen bei klinischen Untersuchungen–eine Erwiderung 
[Questions of Patent Law With Regard to Clinical Trials—A Rebuttal], 1994 GRUR 319.  The 
details of that controversy are beyond the scope of this Article, as Dr. Pietzcker does not 
generally oppose the public good as a factor for balancing interests. 
147. See Straus, supra note 144, at 318. 
148. See Bruzzone, supra note 64, at 52. 
149. See Walters, supra note 24, at 522. 
150. For a discussion of foreign provisions, see Bruzzone, supra note 64, at 61–62. 
151. See Martin Faehndrich & Winfried Tilmann, Patentnutzende  
Bereitstellungshandlungen bei Versuchen [Supply Activities Using the Patented Invention in 
Experiments], 2001 GRUR 901. 
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Its only limitations are that no purely market-oriented research 
(distribution, marketing, pricing) is covered and that the patented 
invention must not be an apparatus for the invention, but the object of 
those. 
So what, to refer back to St. Paul, is the “best” which is to be 
retained?  Should scholars and practitioners pursue the broader concept 
(Germany) or stick to the narrower construction (U.S.)?  And, in this 
context, will or should the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari 
in Integra, uphold the present, narrow rules established under Federal 
Circuit law?  An indication for a liberalization of present law can be 
seen in the grant of certiorari as such.  The fact that the government in 
its amicus brief decided to weigh in against the Federal Circuit is an 
even stronger sign that some parameters might be shifted. 
In this context, it is also worthwhile remembering that amendments 
to the Hatch-Waxman Act’s experimental use exception have been 
suggested only a few years after the provision was signed into law.  In 
1988, the American Bar Association Patent, Trademark & Copyright 
Committee passed a resolution favoring “in principle an exemption 
from infringement for activities conducted solely for experimental or 
research purposes, not limited to pharmaceutical products.”152 
In the same year, an act was introduced into the House of 
Representatives by then Representative Kastenmeier stating the 
following: 
[I]t would appear desirable to codify a coherent set of principles 
to guide conduct in this area.  Congress should . . . amend title 35 
to provide that the use of a patented invention or process is not 
an act of infringement if done for the purpose of 
experimentation and research.  This requirement should not 
apply only to biotechnology but . . . to all patented inventions.153 
In the author’s view, the European provisions and the amendments 
advanced by the Committee and Representative Kastenmeier suggest 
that there are several good reasons for a broader (yet certainly not 
infinite) experimental use exception.  Because dependent inventions 
cannot be “disconnected” from the prior patents in their commercial use 
 
152. Bruzzone, supra note 64, at 66 (paraphrasing The A.B.A. Patent, Trademark & 
Copyright Comm. Rep. Resolution 101-4, 1988 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK &  
COPYRIGHT L. REP. 25). 
153. Id. at 66–67 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 100-888 (1998)). 
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and because earlier inventors will still be adequately compensated,154 the 
policy considerations on which patent law is founded seem to suggest 
that a broader research exception will further the overall good.155  The 
value of a comparison is to show that a broader exception, in Germany 
as in many countries in the world, actually works without patentees 
having to fear a near-Marxist system obligating them to surrender 
intellectual property rights for some vague society benefit.  In fact, 
Representative Kastenmeier referred, inter alia, to a German source 
when suggesting his modifications.156  Moreover, these comparisons 
reveal that “[t]he lack of a codified experimental use provision in the 
United States stands in sharp contrast to the rest of the world,”157 which 
is, of course, not sufficient to say that the U.S. system is in need of 
improvement. 
Of course, patent owner’s interests have to be safeguarded 
appropriately.  Thus, the author would not subscribe to the idea of a 
“fair use” idea in patent law—that is, allowing infringement whenever it 
is somehow socially beneficial.158 
This Article also should not lead to the conclusion that the Federal 
Circuit was absolutely incorrect in Integra.  In fact, legislative history 
and the wording of the statute seem more likely to support a narrow 
construction.  The U.S. Supremee Court has, as mentioned above, 
referred to the exemption as “clinical trials exemption” in Eli Lilly,159 
yet at the same time it emphasized that there is no limitation to clinical 
trials.160  In light of the ambiguities, it should have been the domain of 
Congress to open up the scope of Hatch-Waxman Act and to precisely 
define the limits.  Instead, it has been felt obligated to act without 
precisely defining the limits. 
 
154. The author acknowledges that this is a subjective term and appreciates the 
problem connected with it.  One could thus make an argument against that as well, which 
would be equally subjective; however, this is a problem implicit in most judgment calls. 
155. Again, this is a subjective term depending on what a society defines as overall 
good. 
156. H.R. REP. NO. 100-888, at 51 (citing P. CHROCZIEL, DIE BENUTZIND 
PATENTIERER ERFINDUNGEN ZU VERSUCHS—UND FORSCHUNGSZWECKKN 174 (1986)). 
157. See Christina Weschler, The Informal Experimental Use Exception:  University 
Research After Madey v. Duke University, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1536, 1539 (2004). 
158. This is advocated by Maureen O’Rourke in Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in 
Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1201 (2000). 
159. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronics, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 676 (1990) (emphasis 
added).   
160. See Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2380–84 (2005). 
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The effects of the Integra decision, however, are not unwelcome in 
light of policy considerations and differing standards abroad.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court may well have (deliberately or not) complied with what 
some scholars have long since demanded: 
To prevent the export of research to countries more “friendly” to 
reverse engineering, to avoid a chilling of research by the current 
state of confusion, and to encourage trade through a harmonized 
worldwide patent system, it is in the interest of the United States 
to resolve the current confusion and enact a research exemption . 
. . .161 
Time will tell whether the U.S. Supreme Court promoted or chilled 
research by its latest opinion.  Monitoring how courts and Congress will 
proceed in the field of experimental use after Integra will remain an 
interesting and rewarding task.  Reverting to the beginning of this 
Article, there is a final argument to be made for the use of international 
comparative law.  International comparisons can, especially in highly 
specialized fields of international business like patent law, contribute 
significantly by showing alternatives, evaluating strengths and 
weaknesses of domestic and foreign approaches, providing material to 
reconsider legislative targets, and, finally, even by furthering 
harmonization of legal systems. 
There is already evidence of this harmonization within the European 
Union in Article 10(6) of Directive 2004/27,162 in which the European 
Union enacted a new provision commonly referred to as the “Roche-
Bolar clause.”  The provision reads as follows: 
Conducting the necessary studies and trials with a view to the 
application of paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 [i.e. the abbreviated 
procedure for obtaining market approval for generic medicinal 
products] and the consequential practical requirements shall not 
be regarded as contrary to patent rights or to supplementary 
protection certificates for medicinal products.163 
The German legislature has already reacted and added § 11(2)(b) to 
the PatG, which is slightly different as it does not imply the requirement 
of an abridged procedure, but generally allows experimental use 
 
161. Bruzzone, supra note 64, at 69. 
162. See Council Directive 2004/27, 2004 O.J. (L136) (EC) (amending Council 
Directive 2001/83, 2001 O.J. (L 311) (EC)). 
163. Id. 
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activities for obtaining market approval.164  This is in line with the 
Federal Supreme Court’s decision in Clinical Trials II. 
The Federal Supreme Court decision and the Roche-Bolar clause 
thus “work together” to narrow the “transatlantic gap” between U.S. 
and German patent law, however positive or negative one might judge 




164. Frank-Erich Hufnagel & Peter Ruess, Neues zum Versuchsprivileg im US-
Patentrecht—Gedanken zur Entscheidung des US Supreme Court in Merck v. Integra, [News 
on Experimental Use in U.S. Patent Law—Thoughts on the U.S. Supreme Court Opinion in 
Merck v. Integra], 2005 MITT. DT. PA. 497, 502 (2005). 
165. Id. 
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APPENDIX:  OVERVIEW CHART 
 
 
U.S. Patent Law 
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). 
German Patent Law 
Patentgesetz, Dec. 18, 





It shall not be an act of 
infringement to make, use, offer  
to sell, or sell within the United 
States or import into the United 
States a patented invention (other
than a new animal drug or 
veterinary biological product (as 
those terms are used in the  
Federal Food, Drug, and  
Cosmetic Act and the Act of  
March 4, 1913) which is primarily 
manufactured using recombinant 
DNA, recombinant RNA, 
hybridoma technology, or other 
processes involving site specific 
genetic manipulation techniques) 
solely for uses reasonably related 
to the development and 
submission of  information under 
a Federal law which regulates the 
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs 
or veterinary biological products. 
 
Die Wirkung des 
Patents erstreckt sich 
nicht auf Handlungen 
zu Versuchszwecken, 





[The effect of the 
patent does not reach 
out to acts for 
experimental purposes 
which relate to the 







All, except new animal drugs 
certain veterinary biological 
products 
 
But, restrictions implied due to 







for uses reasonably related 
to Federal regulatory approval 
Solely 
for purposes related 
to subject matter of 
invention 
